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This paper deals with the influence of the country brand in the fashion 
industries. It explains how some Spanish fashion companies have achieved a 
prominent position in the international market without the support of a 
positive “country of origin effect”, and why their success has not generated a 
reinforcement of the image of Spain in the fashion market. The paper 
examines the evolution of the image of Spain and the Spanish fashion abroad, 
and the internationalization of the main Spanish fashion companies, 
highlighting the keys of the limited influence of the country brand in the 
success of these companies. 
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Over the course of approximately 20 years, between 1990 and 2010, several Spanish 
fashion companies have transformed from being practically unknown outside of Spain to 
being present in the main shopping streets all around the world. Brands such as Zara, 
Mango, Bershka or Desigual currently have thousands of stores in about a hundred 
countries and the vast majority of the products of these brands are sold outside Spain. The 
leading Spanish fashion group, Inditex, is the largest clothing retailer in the world. They 
have achieved this without the support of an influential country brand to provide positive 
connotations in the fashion world, despite having to compete in the international market 
with companies that are supported by a very powerful country of origin effect.  
On the other hand, the international expansion of these Spanish fashion companies 
has not provided a significant improvement in the value of the "made in Spain" brand for 
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fashion products. Despite the promotion campaigns carried out by successive Spanish 
governments, there is no a prestigious international image of Spanish fashion comparable 
to Italy’s, and Spanish fashion companies find no advantage in indicating their country 
of origin. 
This paper analyses the evolution of the Spain brand and the development of the 
main Spanish fashion companies to explain, firstly, the strategies used by these companies 
to counteract the lack of a positive country-of-origin effect that supported their 
penetration in foreign markets and, secondly, why the success of these companies has not 
led to a substantial strengthening of Spain's image in the fashion sector. Therefore, the 
contribution of the article to the existing literature on the country of origin effect is to 
show that, even in sectors as sensitive to this phenomenon as fashion, companies can 
develop successful strategies to erase this effect or to compensate the lack of a positive 
effect. The article also confirms that the construction of a country brand is a complex and 
long-term process, in which the strategy adopted by the companies of the country that 
operate abroad is decisive. 
The business history literature has dealt with the country of origin effect focusing 
mainly on the study of industries that have been supported in the international market by 
the existence of a country brand with strongly positive connotations. For example, the 
works of Véronique Pouillard explore the organisation of haute couture when Paris was 
the undisputed world capital of fashion, and they show how institutions such as the 
Chambre Syndicale de la Couture tried to protect designs and brands of the haute couture 
houses against imitations and promoted the creation of a national brand to strengthen the 
French identity of this industry1. Lourdes M. Font has also analysed the international 
expansion of haute couture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in a 
context determined by the predominance of France in world fashion2. On the other hand, 
Giorgio Riello has studied the success of French footwear in the British market in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, supported as well, among other factors, by the positive 
connotations of the geographical origin of these products3.  
For other countries and other industries, Per H. Hansen has demostrated that the 
penetration of the Danish furniture industry in the global market was hand in hand with 
the construction of Danish Design as a well-known international brand since the interwar 
period4. Pierre-Yves Donzé has analyzed the growth, the entry into the Asian market and 
the transformation of the main brands of the prestigious Swiss watch industry 5. Geoffrey 
Jones has pointed out the strong influence of the country of origin effect in the perfume 
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and cosmetics industries, which was decisive for the international expansion of French 
and American companies6, while Maki Umemura has explained that the lack of success 
of Japanese cosmetics companies outside the Asian market was mainly due to the 
marketing and branding strategy of these companies, which has been influenced by the 
fact that Japan did have a positive image for its fashion and beauty products in Asia but 
not globally7.  
However, the country brand most directly studied by business history researchers 
has been the "Made in Italy". It is not possible to mention here the numerous works that 
have dealt with the development of Italian fashion, so I will limit myself to simply 
pointing out some of those that are closest to the study of the influence of the country 
brand in the conquest of foreign markets. Among them are the works of Marco Belfanti, 
Ivan Paris and Nicola White on the origin of the "Made in Italy". The first highlights the 
leadership of some designers and entrepreneurs in the international launch of Italian 
fashion and how the legacy of the Renaissance was used for the commercial promotion 
and cultural legitimation of this fashion8. Paris looks in depth at the strategies of direct 
promotion used (missions abroad, fashion shows, exhibitions...)9, while White discusses 
the key role played by the United States in the development of the Italian Fashion Style10. 
Elisabetta Merlo, alone and in collaboration with other authors, has investigated how 
Milan became one of the world capitals of fashion and the close relationships between 
industrial firms and fashion designers on which this process was based11. Valeria Pinchera 
has explored the role of Florence, and Cinzia Capalbo of Rome, in launching Italian 
fashion as an international phenomenon12. For his part, Giovanni Luigi Fontana has 
shown how the footwear industry was a prominent component in the international success 
of "Made in Italy"13. 
All of these papers have dealt with international success stories supported by strong 
and positive country of origin images, globally or in certain regions. They are also cases 
in which the foreign success of the country's companies contributed directly to 
strengthening the positive connotations of the country brand. However, this article deals 
with a case of international success in the fashion sector that has not been matched by the 
construction of a leading country brand. Therefore, the main contribution of this research 
to the business history literature is to show a different way of successful development 
within fashion industries, and to analyse its conditioning and characteristics.  
The methodology used has been to contrast the evolution of the image of Spain and 
Spanish fashion abroad with government policies to influence this image and with the 
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competitive strategy followed by the main Spanish fashion companies. The period 
analysed ranges from the mid-1970s to 2015, that is, from the beginning of the crisis that 
prompted a new competitive strategy among Spanish fashion companies until the most 
recent year with reliable data. This chronology tries to cover the whole process of birth, 
development and international success of Spanish fashion companies. 
The paper begins with a review of the literature on the “country of origin effect” on 
the evaluation of products by consumers. Subsequently, it shows how the image of Spain 
abroad has evolved and the policies that have been applied by the Spanish government in 
order to influence this image. The third section evaluates the measures adopted by the 
State to promote Spanish fashion. Then it examines the development and 
internationalization processes of the leading Spanish companies in the sector. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
The country of origin effect 
The effect that the country of origin of a product can have on how consumers 
assess this product, on their decision to buy it and on the price that they are willing to pay 
for it, is a topic that has received much attention from marketing researchers 14 . 
International business literature has also been concerned, albeit to a lesser extent, with 
the way in which the characteristics of the country of origin influence the strategy of 
companies operating abroad15. Currently, it is widely accepted that the country of origin 
of a product influences, either positively or negatively, the perception that consumers 
have of the product and, therefore, their attitude towards it and their intention to purchase 
it as opposed to other competing products16. However, there are significant differences 
between the studies with respect to the degree of influence that they attribute to this 
variable. It seems clear that the influence of the country with which a product is associated 
depends largely on the type of good, the demographic, socio-economic and cultural 
characteristics of the consumers and the strength of the brand under which the product is 
marketed. The country of origin tends to be more highly valued in the purchase of 
consumer durables and luxury goods and services. The most influential consumer 
characteristics are the socio-economic and education level, age, product knowledge and 
involvement in the purchase. The greater the involvement and the greater the objective 
knowledge of the purchase, the lower the influence of the country of origin, and given 
that young consumers are more involved in the purchasing process than older consumers, 
this means that the influence of country of origin increases with age. It also seems that 
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consumers with a higher socio-economic level are more aware of the image of the country 
of origin. With respect to the relationship between the brand of a product and the country 
of origin effect, the latter is weaker when the brand is strong and vice versa. The brands 
that are well-known by consumers are indicators of the quality and other characteristics 
of the product and are more influential than the country of origin. However, although to 
varying degrees, the image of the country influences the perception of the brands 
associated to this country. In turn, the most well-known brands of a country contribute 
decisively to shaping the image of this country.  
In fact, the country of origin effect can be caused by both the generic image of the 
country and the specific image of the products of this country. The image of a country is 
what people think about this country, due to what they know about its political, economic, 
legal and cultural situation, or due to their experiences related to it. Therefore, it 
comprises a series of their beliefs and impressions of the place, a mental construction that 
is composed of cognitive facets, but also affective and regulatory aspects, and influences 
the evaluation of the products associated with the country. A positive image of a country 
helps the companies of this country to enter and prosper in external markets, while a 
negative image hinders this17.  
Some literature on international business also stresses the importance of how 
governments react to the country of origin of companies operating in their territory. 
Governments give preferential treatment to companies from countries with which there 
are collaboration agreements, historical friendship ties, good political relations or that can 
provide desirable resources. In addition, the characteristics of the home country influence 
the resources firms develop and these resources affect the choice of the markets where 
companies operate and can help them to take advantage over other competing companies, 
both foreign and domestic18. 
The image of a country has a particularly favourable impact on consumer 
decisions when it coincides with the positive characteristics that these consumers seek in 
a product. When consumers have a precise image of a product from a country, this image 
directly acts as a source for inferring the quality of the product, and therefore, influences 
their purchasing decision. In this case, the image of the country has an indirect influence 
through its impact on the image of the product. However, when consumers do not have 
this precise image of a product, the image of the country may replace it and become a 
direct indicator of quality for consumers19.  
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Many studies have analysed the country of origin effect on fashion consumption. 
The results vary depending on the characteristics of the products and the consumers. In 
some cases, no clear influence of this variable has been found, but on the whole, it has 
been observed that the country of origin significantly affects the quality assessment made 
by consumers20. Similarly to other goods, fashion articles from developed countries tend 
to be regarded as having a higher quality than those coming from more backward 
countries, and the products of some countries, such as Italy and France, have special 
prestige21.  
The influence of the country with which the brand is associated is greater in the 
case of luxury products. It is no coincidence that the majority of the luxury fashion brands 
come from a few countries, including Italy and France, which account for more than half 
of all of these brands and which are internationally perceived as leading countries in the 
fashion industry. This image, that was the outcome of a long historical process22, provides 
the French and Italian fashion companies with a significant competitive advantage.   
 
The weakness of the made in Spain label 
 The made in Italy label is an excellent visiting card in the fashion world, which 
consumers associate with products of a high quality and stylish design. This positive 
image is based on the historical tradition of luxury artisans and the extraordinary artistic 
heritage of Italy, which intensified and began to be disseminated internationally in the 
1950s thanks to different initiatives to promote fashion23. In contrast, Spanish fashion 
companies have never had a prestigious country image with which to support the 
penetration of their products into foreign markets. The Spain brand has no clear, positive 
and cohesive international position, so these companies have often concealed their 
Spanish origin.  
Over the last fifty years, Spain has undergone a profound modernisation process 
and has experienced considerable economic growth which, since the mid 1970s, has gone 
hand-in-hand with an opening up to international markets, social modernisation and 
political democratisation. Despite having been seriously affected by the recent Great 
Recession, Spain is currently one of the world’s leading economies. In the global ranking 
it holds the 16th position in terms of the size of its GDP, the 12th in terms of its export of 
goods and 11th in terms of the value of its international investments.  However, the 
international image of Spain does not correspond to these economic data.  In the Country 
Brand Index of 2015, Spain held the 23rd position, and in the study recently carried out 
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on the image of Spain by the Elcano Royal Institute, the overall evaluation received by 
Spain was much lower than that obtained by the other European countries considered in 
the study, except for Greece24.  
Not only does Spain’s image currently have a low evaluation, but its positive 
attributes are mainly emotional. Although the image of Spain is not perceived exactly the 
same in all regions of the world, and the knowledge of the country is much less in the 
United States or China, for example, than in Europe, in general Spain is seen as a country 
of leisure and fun, interesting because of its traditions and openness. The economic, 
technological and business aspects, however, are viewed less positively.  The low overall 
assessment is highly influenced by the recent economic crisis, but the biased image of the 
country has been inherited from the past. After Spain’s international isolation during the 
first decades of the Franco dictatorship, in the 1960s a tourism promotion campaign was 
carried out, supported by the slogan “Spain is different”, which revived the romantic 
archetype created in the nineteenth century of an exotic and backward country25. The 
transition to democracy from 1976 significantly improved how Spain was seen abroad, 
particularly in political and institutional aspects, but at the beginning of the 1980s this 
image was still associated to economic backwardness and international consumers were 
unfamiliar with Spanish products and brands26.  
The image of Spain improved substantially from the mid 1980s, with the country’s 
entrance into the European Community and its economic progress. This improvement 
was reinforced by the successive promotional campaigns carried out by the Spanish 
government from the 1980s together with large international events, such as the Football 
World Cup in 1982 and the Barcelona Olympic Games, the Universal Exposition of 
Seville and the 5th Centenary of the discovery of America in 1992.  Spain modernised and 
strengthened its international image, particularly in Europe, with the intention of 
increasing its attractiveness as a tourist destination. However, the main features of this 
image continued to be of an emotional nature, while little progress was made in 
associating the name of Spain with quality, efficiency and technology. According to the 
Brand Asset Valuator study, carried out by the marketing and communication 
multinational Young & Rubicam in 2000, Spain was considered to be a country with 
deficiencies in terms of quality, confidence, value for money and innovation, both in 
Europe and the United States. No significant progress was made in the diffusion of 
Spanish brands and products, or the valuation of these products. According to the study 
carried out in 1996 by the Ortega y Gasset Institute, 70% of those surveyed in the four 
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European countries considered did not know any Spanish brands and did not identify 
Spain with any specific products or skills. The Bozell-Gallup survey, carried out in the 
mid 1990s among over 20,000 consumers in 17 countries, reveals that only 10% of those 
interviewed gave a positive valuation of Spanish products, while 22% assessed them 
negatively27.   
With the objective of updating and strengthening the international image of the 
country, the Spanish government implemented the Proyecto Marca España (Brand Spain 
Project) at the end of 200128. However, the Project was pushed into the background due 
to the change in the ruling party after the elections of 2004. The new government focuses 
the strategy on improving the image of some products in certain countries considered 
priority markets. One of the most prominent was the so-called Made in/Made by Plan, to 
support Spanish companies in the United States, developed by the ICEX (Spanish agency 
for the promotion of investment and exports) in 2009 and 2010, with a budget of 44 
million euros29. Although these actions were limited in terms of sector, geography and 
budget30, in their early years they coincided with a highly positive economic climate for 
Spain, with rapid GDP growth and the international expansion of some of its large 
companies, which gave rise to a rapid improvement of the country’s image. In the Country 
Brand Index of 2007, Spain held the seventh position and was the fourth best-placed 
European country, only behind the United Kingdom, France and Italy.   
However, the confluence of the effects of the international Great Recession with 
the bursting of Spain’s property bubble generated a serious crisis in Spain from 2009. 
Spain’s GDP fell sharply in 2009 and 2012 and the income per capita fell from being 
above the average of the European Union to being below this level after 2010. The 
unemployment rate shot up to above 25% in 2013, the public deficit increased rapidly, 
particularly in 2009 and 2012. Furthermore, the European Union had to bail out part of 
the Spanish financial system. This negative economic evolution generated a serious 
decline in the image of Spain, which was progressively transferred to the international 
classifications. In the Country Brand Index, Spain’s position fell from 7th in 2007 to 23rd 
in 2014.  
In order to address the deterioration of the external image of the country, the new 
government emerging from the 2011 elections resumed the Brand Spain Project and in 
June 2012 created the High Commission of the Government for the Spain Brand, 
responsible for the planning, promotion and coordinated management of the actions of 
all the public and private entities involved in the promotion of the external image of 
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Spain31. The Commissioner had a rank equal to secretary of state, but he did not have its 
own budget and was supported by a very low level of staffing.  The new institution had 
three fields of action: First, the establishment of mechanisms for analysing and 
monitoring the image of Spain. To do this, the Spain Brand Observatory was created 
within the Elcano Royal Institute, with the objective of conducting a rigorous and 
systematic monitoring of this image. Second, the coordination and stimulation of public 
and private actions to promote Spain abroad. And finally, the creation of systems for 
communicating and disseminating the positive aspects of Spain. 
However, the actions developed over the last few years to improve Spain’s image 
seem to have had little success so far32. The promotional campaigns have been harshly 
criticised by some experts who believe that they take the wrong approach, lack credibility 
and are uncoordinated33.  
 
Policies to promote Spanish fashion 
Government efforts to improve the country’s image were accompanied by specific 
campaigns to promote Spanish fashion abroad. The first major campaign with this 
objective was the Plan for Promoting Design and Fashion which began in 1985 and was 
linked to the Textile Reconversion Plan. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Spanish textile 
industry had a production structure that was technically backward and which was too 
large for the new environment of economic openness in which the country was immersed.  
The severe crisis experienced by the companies in the sector led the Spanish government 
to approve a Textile Reconversion Plan which, together with the socio-labour 
readjustment measures, contemplated a whole series of actions to stimulate the 
improvement of production, financial and commercial structures in order to facilitate the 
adaptation of supply to the variations in demand, renew the technology and increase 
competitiveness through design, fashion brands and quality34.  
From 1984, the government wished to further boost the improvement in the 
creativity and quality of the Spanish textile-clothing sector, increasing its value added 
and preparing it to compete in the international market.  To do this, the Plan for Promoting 
Design and Fashion was approved in 1985 and was in force until the end of 198835.  This 
new Plan contemplated the continuity of the support for the projects aimed at promoting 
design and fashion presented by individual firms, while introducing a specific legal 
framework to support collective and institutional projects. An investment of more than 
18 billion pesetas (256 million euros of 2017) was forecast for the period between 1984 
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and 1988. Among the actions developed we can highlight the creation of the Gaudí 
Fashion Week in Barcelona and the Cibeles Fashion Week in Madrid, the foundation of 
the Design and Fashion School in Madrid and the “Moda de España” advertising 
campaign, focused on spreading the image of Spain as a country that created fashion and 
the importance of fashion for the industrial development of the country36.  
In 1988, a Plan for Promoting Design Quality and Fashion for the Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises was created, which also extended the actions to the leather and 
footwear, jewellery and costume jewellery, toy, ceramics and furniture industries.  The 
new plan required an investment of around 10 billion pesetas (more than 140 million 
euros of 2017) for the period 1988-1991 and, contrary to the previous plan, which had 
focused on highlighting the figure of the creators, it basically sought to reinforce the 
leading companies in the different sectors of the fashion industry in order to generate 
carry-over effects in their respective fields37. Overall, these plans in the 1980s were 
successful as they significantly improved the image of Spanish fashion and the knowledge 
of the country’s designers in the domestic market38. 
In the 1990s, other programmes to aid the textile and clothing industries were 
adopted, but they had a much lower budget and were less focused on diffusing Spanish 
fashion. It was not until the twenty-first century that another programme to promote 
Spanish fashion was launched, namely the Plan Global de la Moda (Global Fashion 
Plan), aimed initially at the textile, clothing and footwear sectors, although it was later 
extended to the leather goods, costume jewellery and cosmetics industries.  The Plan was 
designed for a period of four years from 2002 to 2005, with a budget of 48 million euros39, 
but it was extended until 2007 and the total expenditure amounted to over 65 million 
euros40.  
The objective of the Plan was to reinforce the image of Spanish fashion abroad 
and to promote the export of the products from the clothing sector. The promotional tasks 
in foreign markets were undertaken by the ICEX, which implemented the Proyecto 
España Moda (Spain Fashion Project) comprising a series of actions that had been agreed 
with the representatives from the private sector who were involved in the plan. The 
project was based on three strategic pillars: training, promotion in external markets and 
the creation of an international image.  It sought to disseminate the image of Spain as a 
country that creates fashion, in order to enable the most successful Spanish companies to 
identify themselves with the “Made in Spain” brand. The specific measures applied 
included the implementation of a communication and advertising plan of Spanish fashion 
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in foreign markets, the organisation of visits to Spain by buyers, journalists and 
international fashion experts, the promotion of Spanish fashion shows abroad, supporting 
the participation of Spanish firms in the major international fashion shows and the 
organisation of official exhibitions and group participation in fairs in other countries, the 
adaptation of ICEX business programmes to the fashion sector, the organisation of 
courses on foreign markets, the training of specialists in the foreign trade of fashion 
products and the creation of an electronic Spanish fashion portal (fashionfromspain)41. 
After the Global Fashion Plan, the ICEX initiated the Plan for the International 
Promotion of Spanish Fashion 42 , which consisted in continuing to support the 
participation of Spanish companies in international fairs, the organisation of fashion 
shows, the fashion portal www.fashionfromspain.com and the undertaking of advertising 
campaigns in countries considered to be strategic markets, although with a lower 
budget43. In addition to these efforts developed by the central government, as from the 
1980s, the governments of the different Spanish autonomous regions also carried out 
actions to support the fashion industries in their territories, particularly in those regions 
where these industries were highly concentrated, such as Galicia, Catalonia and the 
Region of Valencia.  These promotional policies carried out by the regional governments 
have followed their own strategies and have not been coordinated with the policies of the 
central government. 
However, despite these initiatives, the “made in Spain” label continued to add 
very little value to the products in the fashion sector. According to a study carried out by 
Interbrand in 2009, Spanish fashion was unknown internationally, and therefore, the 
association between the Spain brand and fashion was very weak. The few Spanish brands 
with a significant presence in foreign markets were not recognised as being Spanish by 
many consumers and, although the “made in Spain” fashion articles had a positive 
connotation as they came from Europe, they were less highly valued than  “made in 
France” or “made in Italy” products44.  
 
The international expansion of Spanish fashion companies 
The textile and clothing industries grew rapidly in Spain during the 1960s and 
beginning of the 1970s, driven by the increase in internal demand and highly protected 
from foreign competition. This growth, however, was based on a technologically 
backward production structure in which there was a predominance of small firms that 
were labour intensive, with low productivity levels and limited specialisation 45 . 
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Therefore, despite the low wages and the incentives provided by the State, the Spanish 
products were not competitive internationally and textile and clothing exports did not 
reach large volumes. In 1974 the value of the exports of these types of goods was almost 
eight times higher in Italy than in Spain.    
In the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the textile and clothing 
industries were severely affected by the international economic crisis and external 
competition, which increased after Spain entered the European Community in 1986. 
Employment and production fell dramatically and many companies began to operate in 
the informal economy. In order to facilitate the modernisation of the sector and its 
adaptation to the new environment of international competition, the Spanish government 
approved the Textile Reconversion Plan in 1981, which was followed by the Plan for 
Promoting Design and Fashion in the second half of the 1980s and the Textile-Clothing 
Competitiveness Plans in the 1990s.  
The effective integration of Spain into the European Community in 1986 implied 
the end of the export promotion policy that had been applied until then and a substantial 
reduction of the tariff barriers.  Both of these phenomena reduced the competitiveness of 
the Spanish industry, which was also impaired by the appreciation of the peseta against 
other currencies. Spanish wages were lower than those of the more developed European 
countries, but higher than those of developing countries and even those of other 
competitors in southern Europe, such as Portugal. Furthermore, the Spanish companies 
had less experience in the international market and a level of design and fashion 
development that was much lower than that of the companies in other European countries, 
particularly France and Italy. Therefore, the imports of textile and clothing products shot 
up, both in the low price segment from developing countries and in the high quality 
segment, mainly from other countries in the European Community. Exports, in contrast, 
increased much more slowly. The situation of the sector was worsened by the fall in 
demand due to the overall economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s.    
However, from 1994 there was strong export growth based on the devaluation of 
the Spanish currency and the containment of wage increases. In the textile industry, 
exports grew more slowly after 1999 and then shrank with the crisis of 2008. In the 
clothing sector, however, the boom in exports accelerated even more from 2001 and, 
although they decreased sharply between 2008 and 2010 due to the international 
recession, they began to grow again in 2011. The recovery of the international 
competitiveness of these industries was based on a profound technological renovation 
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process, which began in the 1980s, and on the progressive specialisation in high quality 
products with a greater value added. In the subsector of knitted goods, for example, 
production per worker practically doubled between 1984 and 1994, substantially reducing 
the difference in productivity with respect to Italy46. The modernisation of all of these 
fashion industries was favoured by their high concentration in a few highly specialised 
industrial districts, where the existence of Marshallian external economies facilitated the 
transformation of the product and the adaptation to the new market conditions47.  A 
delocalisation process of the most labour intensive activities also took place; first towards 
other Spanish regions with lower wages; then towards nearby countries with even lower 
labour costs, such as Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia or Turkey and, in a third phase, towards 
China and other countries in the Far East.  
The large exporting efforts of the Spanish firms were largely made in response to 
the difficulties that they were experiencing in the domestic market. On the one hand, due 
to the limited size of this market, where the per capita consumption of clothes represented 
less than 40% of the level in Germany, the United Kingdom, France or Italy. On the other 
hand, due to the strong import penetration. Despite the growth of exports, the textile-
clothing sector continued to have a trade balance deficit in Spain and the increase in 
domestic consumption did not prevent the progressive decrease in clothes production 
after the second half of the 1990s.  Meanwhile, textile production continued to grow until 
the end of the twentieth century, but fell sharply after 2002. In addition, except for the 
second half of the 1990s, in both industries the labour force reduced at a constant rate and 
by 2014 the number of workers was just one third of those in 1990. The cause of this 
setback was the unstoppable progress of imports from Asia, due to the progressive 
reduction of restriction quotas for these imports from the mid 1990s, as stipulated in the 
GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which led to the complete 
liberalisation of this trade in 2005, and due to the entry of China into the World Trade 
Organisation at the end of 2001. Once again, the State had to launch plans to support the 
sector: in 2000 the Competitiveness Plan was approved for the textile-clothing sector; in 
the following years specific actions of the Technical Research Promotion Programme 
were put into practice for these industries; and in 2006 a new Support Plan was initiated 
for the sector with socio-labour measures aimed at reducing the impact of job losses and 
with industrial and financial measures to improve the competitiveness of firms48. 
In response to the high level of competition in the Spanish market, since the 1980s, 
some companies opted to enter the distribution business, creating commercial chains and 
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assuming the control of the whole cycle of the product, from the design and manufacture 
to the marketing and distribution, although externalising many of the phases of the 
production process or subcontracting all of the manufacturing process in other countries. 
These companies that underwent forward vertical integration and others that were created 
with no manufacturing facilities, engaging only in the design and marketing of the 
product, they initially operated on the domestic market, but soon began to expand into 
other countries. The internationalisation process is a very recent phenomenon as the 
majority of the brands that currently can be found in many countries around the world did 
not start their penetration into foreign markets until the 1990s and the process did not 
accelerate until the end of the decade.    
The strategy of these companies has been to respond to the growing competition 
in the sector by specialising in medium-low priced clothing, but with an attractive design 
that follows the fashion trends, and by increasing the flexibility in their production and 
the speed of adapting to market demand through organisational and technological 
innovations. These companies started to renew their products more and more frequently 
and now they are constantly launching new collections throughout the year, in very short 
production cycles. This is the so-called “fast fashion”. In order to adapt the articles to the 
latest trends, the most successful companies have organised a very fast creation and 
manufacturing process, which enables them to imitate the style of the clothes exhibited 
in the major fashion shows and launch the product a few weeks later. In some cases, 
market research is carried out whereby short series are created and then produced in a 
very short time depending on how the demand responds49.  
There are very few Spanish fashion companies that have achieved a truly strong 
presence in the international market. Only four companies (Inditex, Mango, Cortefiel and 
Desigual) exceed or are near to reaching an annual turnover of one billion euros, and only 
eight more clothing companies exceed 100 million euros (see table 1). In fact, the success 
of Spanish fashion is fundamentally the success of Inditex, which is currently the number 
one fashion retailer in the world. Its turnover figures, employment and the size of its retail 
network are more than three times the sum of the 11 Spanish companies that follow it.  
Furthermore, to a large extent, the development of these other companies has been based 
on the imitation of the strategies of Inditex and has benefitted from the favourable 
business environment for these types of companies created in many countries by the prior 
success of the Galician fashion group. Therefore, we shall focus the analysis on a 
company level on the cases of Inditex, the pioneer and leading company, and on Mango 
 15 
which is an example of the companies that have imitated the strategy of the Galician 
group while incorporating their own features.    
 
Table 1. The largest fashion companies in Spain 
Clothing companies 






Inditex Zara, Massimo Dutti, Bershka,  
Pull&Bear, Stradivarius, Oysho, Zara 
Home, Uterqüe y Lefties 
1963 20,900 152,854 
Punto Fa Mango, Mango Man, Mango Kids y 
Violeta 
1984 2,327 15,793 
Cortefiel Spirngfield, Women'secret, Cortefiel y 
Pedro del Hierro 
1880 1,095 10,592 
Desigual Desigual 1984 933 4,200 
Pepe Jeans Pepe Jeans y Hackett 1973 538 2,500 
Sociedad 
Textil Lonia 
Purificación García y CH Carolina 
Herrera 
1997 307 2,500 
Mayoral Mayoral 1941 325 1,200 
Pronovias  Pronovias 1922 150 850 
Punt Roma Punt Roma 1976 150 1,179 
Liwe 
Española 
Inside 1973 141 1,439 
Comdifil Shana, Double Agent, Friday's Project y 
SHN 
2010 141 900 
Adolfo 
Domínguez 
Adolfo Domínguez 1976 108 1,419 
Source: “El Mapa de la moda 2016 (XI): La ‘Spanish armada’ de la moda.” Modaes.es, July 19, 
2016. 
 
Thanks to an exemplary application of the fast-fashion competitive strategy, 
Inditex has been the leading clothes retailer in the world since 2013, with sales in 2015 
of almost 21 billion euros and a market value of 94 billion euros, 927% higher than when 
it was listed on the stock exchange in May 200150. Its founder, Amancio Ortega, began 
his career in the clothing sector as a sales assistant in several of the leading clothes stores 
in A Coruña, a medium-sized city in northeastern Spain, at the end of the 1950s. With the 
experience and contacts that he acquired, he began a modest production of dressing gowns 
and underwear. The next step was the founding of Confecciones GOA in 1963, which 
was engaged in the manufacture of ladies underwear and clothes. This was followed by 
other companies also located in A Coruña. The group also entered the retailing business 
when it opened its first Zara store in A Coruña in 1975 for the sale of mid-range clothing. 
Soon the chain extended with other stores in the city and the rest of the region51. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s, Ortega took the leap into the national market. To 
do this he incorporated qualified professionals into the management team, increased the 
production capacity, externalised the sewing of garments to independent workshops and 
cooperatives, and located Zara stores in the best shopping areas of the main Spanish cities. 
In 1985 he founded Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex), a new parent company to 
control his group of companies, which comprised seven clothing companies, one 
thousand workers and 41 stores, with a turnover equivalent to 87 million euros. At the 
end of the 1980s the company began to penetrate foreign markets, first in Portugal (1988) 
and then in the United States (1989) and France (1990). However, it was during the 
following years that the real international expansion of the group took place and by the 
end of the twentieth century Inditex had a presence in 33 countries with more than 1000 
stores and its turnover exceeded 2.6 billion euros, of which more than half was earned in 
foreign markets (table 2).  
 














1994 756 25 140 424 5,018 8 
1997 1,217 42 254 622 10,891 14 
2000 2,615 52 521 1,080 24,004 33 
2003 4,599 54 873 1,922 39,760 48 
2006 8,196 60 1,790 3,131 69,240 64 
2009 11,084 68 2,374 4,607 92,301 74 
2012 15,946 79 3,913 6,009 120,314 86 
2015 20,900 82 4,699 7,013 152,854 88 
Source: Annual reports of Inditex. 
 
Although at the beginning of the 1990s loans were widely used to finance this 
expansion, from the middle of this decade the company began to reduce its debt, financing 
its growth mainly with the reinvestment of earnings52. The international expansion was 
fast until the economic crisis of 2007, after which it continued at a more moderate rate. 
In 2007, Inditex had almost 3,700 stores distributed over 68 countries, the number of 
workers was close to 80,000 and its turnover was almost 9,5 billion euros of which 63% 
corresponded to sales outside of Spain. Eight years later, the sales figures and the number 
of stores and workers had practically doubled, 88% of revenue came from abroad and the 
company had extended its retail network to 88 different countries (table 2). Europe has 
remained the principal market and in 2015 it still accounted for 62% of the group’s sales, 
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although America, with 15% and Asia with 20% have increased their weight, particularly 
after 2009. China has become the second largest market for the group in terms of the 
number of stores.  
Currently, the Inditex group is composed of almost three hundred companies 
engaged in manufacturing, logistics and retail distribution, and is structured into eight 
retail brands aimed at different demand segments (Zara, Pull&Bear, Massimo Dutti, 
Bershka, Stradivarius, Oysho, Zara Home y Uterqüe). These brands do not use words that 
evoke the Spanish origin of the company and Inditex does not carry out any actions to 
identify them as Spanish. The country of origin is ignored in order to achieve the image 
of global brands, since the link with the brand Spain does not bring positive connotations 
in the world market of fashion products. According to a survey performed by the Spanish 
Leading Brands Forum, less than a third of foreign consumers identified the Zara brand 
as Spanish and a high percentage of them thought it was Italian53. 
The competitive advantage of Inditex is principally based on the flexibility of its 
production and the efficiency of its logistics system, which enables it to adjust its supply 
to the demand much faster and to continually introduce new products54. The vertical 
integration of the group greatly contributes to this flexibility, shortening the time between 
the design of the article and its manufacture as, contrary to some of its main competitors, 
Inditex does not only design and sell its clothing, externalising its production to far away 
countries with low costs but, for highly fashionable garments that need to be made 
quickly, it also undertakes a large part of the manufacturing process itself or contracts 
nearby cooperatives and companies in Galicia and Northern Portugal.  
Flexibility is also achieved through the use of avant-garde technology in its 
production processes (with the robotization of the design and cutting phases from the 
beginning of the 1990s), in the connection between the head office and the points of sale 
(using the technological advances in information and communication) and in logistics 
(with the automation of the eight large warehouses located in different parts of Spain) and 
through the autonomous operation of the different retail brands of the group.    
Another key source of Inditex’s competitive advantage is the adaptation of its 
products to the taste and needs of the consumers. To achieve this it has a team of designers 
who visit the principal international fashion shows and it also uses “trend spotters” who 
observe the consumption of their potential clients55. Furthermore, the company uses its 
stores as a daily source of detailed information about the evolution of demand through 
electronic systems which have progressively been perfected. On the other hand, the 
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existence of the different brands of the group enables it to gain a very wide spectrum of 
consumers, who are driven to frequently visit the stores due to the high rotation of 
products, while the careful selection of the points of sale and the careful window dressing 
guarantees the public visibility of the brands without large investments in advertising. In 
fact, while its main international competitors spend more than 5% of their revenue on 
advertising, Inditex only spends 0.3%56. 
 Mango, a family business group with the corporate name of Punto Fa SL, is 
Spain’s second largest fashion exporter. In 2015, its sales exceeded 2.3 billion euros, 
more than 80% of which came from abroad, mainly from other European countries (42%). 
It employs 16,000 workers and has more than 2,700 points of sale distributed over more 
than one hundred countries (table 3). The origin of the company dates back to 1984, when 
Isak Andic, of Turkish descent but a resident of Barcelona since the age of 13, together 
with his brother Nahman, opened their first store in Barcelona, with the name Mango, to 
sell imported ladies clothing. The following year they had five stores in Barcelona and 
began to expand throughout the rest of Spain57.   
Until the mid 1990s, the company focused on consolidating its business in Spain, 
defining the concept of the product, the type of store and the brand image, adopting a just-
in-time system and extending the retail network. In 1993, it had one hundred points of 
sale in the country. At this time, the brand also began to explore the external market 
through franchises. The first stores established abroad were in Portugal in 1992, followed 
by others in France, Andorra, Switzerland, Malta and Mexico in 1994 and Belgium, 
Greece, South Korea, Taiwan and Israel in 1995. At the end of this phase a total of 37 
franchises had been created abroad58. 
However, it was after 1996 when Mango truly focused on its international 
expansion, complementing the franchises with the creation of its own stores. By 1997, 
foreign sales exceeded those in Spain and at the end of the twentieth century the brand’s 
stores were present in almost fifty countries. Measured in current euros, sales doubled 
between 2000 and 2008, and doubled again between 2008 and 2015. In this second phase, 
the company has invested heavily in the development of its logistics system to improve 
its information and to increase its reaction speed to changes in demand. Its supply has 
diversified with the incorporation of a line of complements in 2005, a line of men’s 
fashion in 2008, new children’s fashion brands, sports clothing and underwear in 2013, a 
line of large sizes for women in 2014 and baby clothes in 2015. It has also modified the 
characteristics of its points of sale with the introduction of large-sized stores in 2012.     
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Table 3. Indicators of the evolution of Mango, 2000-2015 
Year Sales (millions 
of euros) 












2000 548.1 60 105.8 515 4,657 49 
2002 744.9 69 124.3 629 4,729 69 
2004 831.7 71 158.9 768 5,453 75 
2006 942.3 74 197.0 995 5,901 89 
2008 1,100.7 77 191.8 1,228 7,865 90 
2010 1,269.5 81 186.9 1,757 8,690 102 
2012 1,690.9 84 209.2 2,598 12,211 109 
2014 2,017.1 81 223.2 2,741 15,793 109 
2015 2,327.0 81 170.7 2,730 16,623 109 
Source: Annual reports of Mango. 
 
Mango has followed a strategy which increasingly resembles that of Inditex, but 
displays some significant differences with the Galician firm. First, from the outset, Mango 
has never engaged in its own production activities. The company designs the product and 
contracts its manufacture to other companies in which it has no participation and which 
do not work exclusively for Mango, although they usually have long-term relationships 
with it. Companies from the Far East constitute the main origin of Mango clothing, 
making around 70% of the garments. This geographical distribution of the suppliers is 
another difference with Inditex, for which Asia is also a principal source of suppliers but 
not to such an extreme as Mango, because it uses European suppliers to a greater extent.   
The fact that Mango uses less geographically close suppliers explains why the 
production process and distribution cycles of the Catalan group’s products are not as short 
as those of Inditex. The average time for the design, manufacture and distribution of the 
garments used to vary between 3 and 4 months59. However, in 2015 the Catalan company 
announced a change in its strategy in order to be able to renew the collections in its stores 
every two weeks and during that year there was a significant increase in the production 
carried out in Europe and Turkey60.  
Another difference with the majority of the brands of the Inditex group, although 
one which has been reduced in recent years, is that existing in the type of product and 
price. Although Mango began as a chain of affordable clothes, it progressively increased 
the quality and prices of its products, seeking to position itself in the medium-high 
segment, with prices that were higher than those of Zara, its most direct competitor. 
However, this business model began to show its limitations since 2008, with the 
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international economic crisis, so, in 2012, the company began to substantially reduce its 
prices and in 2015 it created a new line of clothing for younger consumers with even 
lower prices61.  
Mango also differs from Inditex in terms of the growth model of its retail network. 
While the Galician company has based its strategy fundamentally on own stores, the 
Catalonian company has largely used franchises for its international expansion, 
particularly outside of Europe. In 2005, only 30% of Mango’s points of sale were own 
stores, and in 2014, after several years of applying a strategy to increase the number of 
own stores, this figure was still below 40%. In contrast, franchises account for just 13% 
of Inditex’s stores. Of Mango’s points of sale outside of Europe, 95% are franchises (with 
the exception of Turkey where all of the more than one hundred stores are own stores), 
while in the case of Inditex, only 35% of stores outside of Europe are franchises, most of 
them in Asia.  
On the other hand, Mango began its online business much before Inditex and has 
developed it to a greater extent. Mango was among the first Spanish fashion companies 
to begin selling on the Internet in the year 2000 and in 2006 it created a virtual outlet store 
to complement its online collection. Furthermore, it has introduced its products into some 
of the principal online sales channels62.  Currently, the e-commerce part of the business 
earns the company 234 million euros, almost 11% of its sales. Inditex, however, did not 
begin its online sales activity until 2007, when it began to apply it to Zara Home (its home 
textile chain). It did not introduce it into its main brand Zara until 2010 and it did not 
begin to use it in the rest of the brands of the group until 201163.  
 
Conclusions 
 The image of Spain abroad has traditionally highlighted the fun and festive 
features of the country, but has not associated it to efficiency, quality or modernity. The 
campaigns developed by the Spanish government to modify this situation have not been 
very effective because they have not had sufficient economic resources and have not been 
designed appropriately. Furthermore, they have not been maintained over time but have 
varied in accordance with the changes in political power and did not start until the mid 
1980s, while studies on the subject indicate that constructing the image of a country is a 
long-term phenomenon. In addition, this transformation of Spain’s image has been 
slowed and even reversed by the strong impact that the recent Great Recession has had 
on the country.  
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 The Spanish companies could not take advantage of a good international valuation 
of the country’s fashion. Despite the fact that some good designers have emerged from 
Spain throughout history, Spanish fashion was unknown in the international market. The 
most famous Spanish fashion designer, Cristóbal Balenciaga, was, and continues to be, 
associated to French haute couture for which he worked for more than three decades. It 
is true that Spanish fashion has been supported by different promotion plans developed 
by the central government and by some initiatives implemented by the regional 
governments from the 1980s. This public action has had positive effects, mainly on the 
image of Spanish fashion in Spain itself. But it has not been enough. On the one hand, 
with the exception of the plans implemented in the 1980s, the budgets for these types of 
action have not been sufficient. On the other hand, they have lacked continuity over time, 
due to the variations arising from the changes in the political power. Finally, the 
promotional campaigns have been weakened by the lack of coordination between the 
actions of the central government and that of the regional governments. 
 Spanish companies have been able to overcome the disadvantage of a poor 
valuation of the “Made in Spain” label by blurring their Spanish origin. Their 
international advertising campaigns never mention their country of origin and many have 
adopted brand names that suggest a different origin, often Italian or Anglo-Saxon.  
 The Spanish companies have also countered the weakness of the “Made in Spain” 
brand by specialising in a new type of fashion that is valued not for the quality of the 
product and the elegance in the design, but for its innovation, differentiation and good 
price. As Spanish fashion brands are positioned in the medium-low market segment, they 
have a lesser need for prestige than for example the “Made in Italy” products. In fact, 
consumers do not seek high quality and elegance in the garments of the most successful 
Spanish brands. They look for originality and fashion at an affordable price. Furthermore, 
these consumers are, on the whole, young and highly involved in the purchase process, 
which is the type of consumer least influenced by the country of origin of the product.  
On the other hand, these companies have compensated for the lack of positive 
connotations with respect to their origin by offering a global fashion unrelated to any 
specific country, but to a brand which takes advantage of the standardisation of tastes on 
a global scale arising from globalisation. The great strength of these fast fashion brands 
has also contributed to minimising the influence of the country of origin. Clothes from 
Zara are perceived as Zara fashion not Spanish fashion.  
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The history of the internationalization process of Inditex and Mango shows that 
these companies made their expansion abroad regardless of the image of Spain. Their 
penetration in the different countries did not depend on the image of Spain in them, but 
on their geographical proximity, the degree of openness of their markets and the business 
opportunities that these countries offered. During the years of the recent Great Recession, 
while the brand Spain deteriorated rapidly, Inditex and Mango continued their impressive 
international expansion.  
Therefore, what has occurred over the last two decades is not so much a success 
of Spanish fashion but a success of a few Spanish companies. These companies have 
broken away from the traditional production-oriented fashion model structured into 
seasons and have replaced it with a new model of fast fashion, where garments are 
continually renewed and it is now demand that orientates fashion. We should highlight 
the leadership of Inditex, which has been the key company in the development of this 
new model. Its example has not only guided the international expansion of other Spanish 
fashion companies, but has obliged the whole of the sector to evolve throughout the 
world. 
 However, the success of these companies has not been able to enhance the prestige 
of the “Made in Spain” label in the fashion sector for different reasons. First, because this 
success is a very recent phenomenon and, as previously indicated, the process of 
modifying the image of a country and the image of the products of a country usually 
require long periods of time. Second, because the leading companies follow a strategy of 
not referring to their Spanish origin and market themselves as global companies. Another 
important reason has been the specialisation of these companies in medium quality 
products with a low price, which does not evoke prestigious connotations.   
 In addition, the success of Spanish brands should not be exaggerated. Although 
more than several thousand Spanish companies in the fashion sector export their products, 
the immense majority of them are small companies that have a low impact on the 
international market. The firms that have achieved a significant presence are very few. 
Inditex, the world’s leader in the sector is an exceptional case. The three Spanish 
companies behind Inditex with an annual turnover of one billion euros have a market 
share that is much smaller than that of the large international fashion groups and therefore 
are positioned much lower down on the world ranking. The success of the Spanish firms 
is notable due to its newness, the speed at which it has been achieved and the exceptional 
case of Inditex, but Spain does not dominate the international fashion market and 
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therefore a sudden identification of the “made in Spain” label with prestigious fashion 
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